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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
MEL VIN M. MILLER, dba S & E
DISTRIBUTING COMPANY,
and LINDSEY WAREHOUSE
COMPANY, INC.,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
THE INDUSTRIAL
COMMISSION OF UTAH,
DARLENE F. ASAY,
widow of LeRoy M. Asay,
deceased, FRANK E.
MARTENS, and THE STATE
INSURANCE FUND,
Defendants.

Case No.
11873

BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
This was an application filed by Darlene F.
Asay with the Industrial Commission of the State
of Utah to recover Workmen's Compensation Benefits for the death of her husband, which death occurred during the course of his employment.
DISPOSITION IN INDUSTRIAL COMMISION
At a pre-hearing of the Industrial Commission
it was stipulated by the parties and ordered by the
hearing examiner that on the 5th day of August,
1966, LeRoy M. Asay, while employed as a truck
1

driver sustained an injury arising out of or directly
in the course of his employment in that he was killerl
instantly in a truck rollover.
At the time of said death Mr. Asay was 25 years
of age, receiving a wage of $325.00 per month working the usual 40 hours per week.
The pre-hearing order of the Commission provided in paragraph 3 as follows:
"At the time of his death, the deceased
was earning a wage sufficient for his dependent to receive the maximum workmen's compensa:tion benefits provided by law."
Darlene F. Asay, the Applicant in this action,
was the wife of the deceased LeRoy M. Asay, and as
such was the sole surviving dependent of Mr. Asay.
The sole issue to be determined at the hearing
was "Who was the employer of the deceased LeRoy
M. Asay"?
After the hearing the Industrial Commission
held that LeRoy M. Asay was employed by Melvin
M. Miller doing business as 'the S & E Distributing
Company and there was no insurance policy in effect
covering the deceased LeRoy M. Asay.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The applicant Darlene F. Asay seeks to sustain
the order of the Industrial Oommission insofar as
it finds the applicant is the sole surviving dependent
of the deceased LeRoy M. Asay and entitled to the
2

rnaxi 11mm benefits provided by the law but seeks to
Jc'.'el'f(-. the award of the Industrial Commission insofar as it determines that the State Insurance Fund
is not liable to pay said benefits to the applicant.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On the 5th clay of August, 1966, LeRoy M. Asay,
while employed as a truck driver by the Lindsey
\Yarehouse Company, sustained an injury arising
out of or directly in the course of his employment in
that he was killed instantly in a truck rollover.
At the time of said death Mr. Asay was 25 years
of age, receiving a wage of $325.00 per month working the usual 40 hours pe1· week. At the time of his
death, the deceased was earning a wage sufficient
for his dependent to receive the maximum workmen's
compensation benefit provided by law.
Darlene F. Asay, the Applicant in this action,
was the wife of the deceased LeRoy M. Asay, and as
such was the sole surviving dependent of Mr. Asay.
Prior to the 13th day of June, 1966, the deceased was employed by the S&E Distributing Company as a truck driver. The S & E Distributing Comwas owned and operated by Mr. Frank E. Martens.
On or about the 13th day of June, 1966, Mr.
Miller, owne1· and on behalf of the Lindsey Warehouse Company entered into negotiations and arrangements to purchase the operation known as the
3

S & E Distributing Company. On approximately
same date Mr. Miller informed all of the employeei
of the operation known as S & E Distributing Com.
pany that the S & E Distributing Company had been
sold and they would now be working for a new owner,
(T 271) the Lindsey Warehouse Company.
The Lindsey Warehouse Company commenced
to exercise complete dominion and control over the
entire operation previously known as the S & E Distributing Company including the collection of the
accounts receivable, the selling, returning and distl'ibuting of the inventory. (T 272, 273) 'The Lindsey Warehouse Company commenced to make a common use of the equipment between the two operations,
including the use of trucks, pallet jacks, pallets, office equipment, supplies and employees. (T 250, 272)
The S & E Distributing Company and the Lindsey Warehouse Company were separated by a joint
wall and were immediately adjacent to each other.
For several years past, the operation now known
as the Lindsay Warehouse Company had undergone
several changes in its organization and had on at
least one prior occasion acquired another business
and merged it into the Lindsey Warehouse operation.
(T 336, 337)
For many years the operation now known as
Lindsey Warehouse has been insured by the State
Insurance Fund. (T 188-190) Although the name of
the operation was changed several times over the
4

yea1·s the State Insurance Fund did not issue a new
w!icy of insurance, but merely issued new endorsen1ents fo1· the changes. (T 188-190)
On the employer's payroll and premium report

form filed with the State Insurance Fund prior to

the death of the decendent LeRoy M. Asay near the
early part of 1966 the State received written notice
that the operation known as the Lindsey Warehouse
Company had been incorporated. The State Insurance Fund, however, did not issue an endorsement
changing the name of the policy from the proprietorship to the corporation until September 13, 1966, or
approximately one month after the death of the decedent. (T 190)
In addition to the operations carried on by the
Lindsey Warehouse Company at their main location,
they also carried on similar operations at 45 South
3rd West, Salt Lake City, Utah and the employees at
this operation were included on the same employer's
payroll and premium report form. ( T 295, 296)
Prior to the acquisition of the S & E Distributing operation, Mr. Miller consulted with his accountant, Mr. Maxwell. Mr. Maxwell advised Mr. Miller
to purchase the S & E Distributing Company and
include it in the Lindsey Warehouse Corporation. He
advised Mr. Miller to file with each applicable State
or Governmental authority one set of reports for the
entire operation. He also advised Mr. Miller to maintain, for accounting purposes only, such separate re5

cords as \voukl br necessary to determine the profit.
ability of the S & E Distributing opel'ation. ( T
'
390)
The original payment fol' the pul'chase of the S
& E Distributing Company was made by a Lindsey
\"Val'ehouse Corporation check and the accounting
entl'y for said purchase was made on account No.
242, a catch-all account for the Corporation. (Ex. I,
T 339, 390, 244)
Mr. Maxwell, the accountant, was busily engaged doing work fol' another client, and was also out of
town immediately following the acquisition of the S
& E Distributing Company and was not able to place
the payroll fol' the S & E Distl'ibuting operation in
the IBM accounting system of the Lindsey Warehouse Company. (T 429, 430, 431) The employees
of the S & E Distributing operation wel'e paid on
S & E Distributing checks until the changeover to
the IBM accounting system was completed several
weeks later.
The employer's payroll and premium report
form was prepared by Melvin James Miller, who was
the office manager. The i·eport was prepared by taking the information found on the quarterly Federal
report form. (T 351, 352) When the employer's pay·
roll and premium report form was prepared for the
end of June, 1966, the payroll for Mr. LeRoy M. Asay
was not included on the report form since his payroll
was not included on the Federal quarterly report
6

form r>repared by the IBM accounting system. (T
·1::-, 1,
356)

M1·. Maxwell, the accountant, testified he did
not file an amended tax report with the Federal Government to include the employees of the S & E Distributing Company operation for the last two weeks
of June. Since it was such a small portion of the period, he merely included it in the next report filed with
the Federal Government. ( T 380, 381)
PRE-HEARING ORDER
It was ordered in the pre-hearing order on this
matte1· the "The sole and controlling issue to be resolved a:t the hearing is the responsible party as the
employer of the deceased."
This issue was to be resolved on several alternative theories of proof.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
LEROY M. ASAY, DECEASED, WAS AT THE
TIME OF HIS DEATH EMPLOYED BY THE
LINDSEY WAREHOUSE COMPANY

On or about the 13th day of June, 1966, Mr. Melvin M. Miller as agent for the Lindsey Warehouse
Corporation entered into an agreement with Mr.
Frank E. Martens, the sole owner of the S & E Distributing Company, to purchase the S & E Distributing Company. At that time a written memorandum
was entered into by both parties setting forth the
general terms of the purchase agreement. A check
7

ch-awn on the Lindsey Warehouse Company account
was then delivered to Frank E. Martens as the first
payment or the down payment for the purchase of
the S & E Distributing Company.
No evidence was offered by the State Insuranct
Fund or by any other pai·ty to show that Mr. Melvin
M. Miller was acting in any capacity other than as
agent for the Lindsey Warehouse Company. No evidence was introduced at the hearing by any party to
show that Mr. Melvin M. Miller treated or managed
the S & E Distributing operation as his own private
personal business apart from the corporation.
The accountant, Mr. Maxwell, testified at great
length that he discussed the purchase of the S & E
Distributing operation with Mr. Miller and advised
Mr. Miller to purchase the S & E Distributing Com·
pany and include it in the Lindsey Warehouse Cor·
poration operation. He advised Mr. Miller to file with
each applicable State or Governmental authority one
set of reports for the entire operation. He advised
Mr. Miller to maintain, for accounting purposes only,
such separate records as would be necessary to de·
termine the profitability of the S & E Distributing
operation. (T 375, 390) No evidence or testimony
was offered at the hearing which in any way contra·
dieted the testimony offered by Mr. Maxwell.
Mr. Miller testified at the hearing that pursuant
to his discussion and instructions from Mr. Maxwell
he then as agent for the Lindsey Warehouse Corpor·
8

ation purchased the S & E Distribu'ting Company ope1·ation and made the down payment with a check
,: ..
nn
Lindsey Warehouse Corporation. The
purchase was credited to a catch-all account of the
Lindsey '\Varehouse Corporation - account number

242. (T 340)

Mr. Miller testified that he attempted to terminate the lease for the building in which the S & E
Distributing business was being conducted but was
unsuccessful. ( T 273, 27 4) The operation known as
the S & E Distributing Company prior to the acquisition by the Lindsey 1Narehouse Company was adjacent to the Lindsey Warehouse Company and a joint
wall separated the two businesses.
Immediately after the acquisition of the S & E
Distributing Company by the Lindsey Warehouse
Company there was an immediate sharing and joint
use of the equipment of the two companies, including
the use of trucks, pallet jacks, pallets, office equipment, supplies and employees. (T 250, 272)
Mr. Miller for all practical purposes was the
sole owner of the Lindsey Warehouse Company. Mr.
Miller was also for all practical purposes the sole
manager of the Lindsey Warehouse Company. As
such Mr. Miller immediately began to exercise complete control over the employees and the accounts and
the equipment of the S & E Distributing Company in
behalf of the Lindsey Warehouse Corporation. The
only way in which the Lindsey Warehouse Company
9

could show any outwa1·d signs of control over the S
& E Distributing operation would be by and through
its sole owner and manager - Mr. Miller.
At the time of the hearing of this case no testimony or evidence was offered to show that Mr. Miller
acted in his own personal capacity in purchasing the
S & E Distributing operation. No evidence or testimony was offered to show that Mr. Miller did not intend to make the S & E Distributing operation part
of the Lindsay Warehouse Corporation. No evidence
or testimony was offered to show that Mr. Miller did
not
begin to interchange and exercise
joint use of the trucks, pallet jacks, pallets, office
equipment, supplies and employees of the two operations.
In short, it could be said that it is uncontroverted by any evidence, even a scintilla of evidence, that
all of the acts of Mr. Miller were done in behalf of
the Lindsey Warehouse Corporation.
The hearing examiner arbitrarily and capriciously took no cognizance whatsoever of the testimony
of Mr. Maxwell, (not an employee) the accountant
for the Lindsey Warehouse Company, and a disin·
t€rested witness.
The hearing examiner arbitrarily and capriciously completely ignored all of the testimony of Mr.
Miller concerning the purchaS€ of the S & E Distributing operation and its inclusion in the Lindsey
Warehouse Company.
10

The hearing examiner then held that Mr. Miller
rlirl not pu1 chase the S & E Distributing operation
a::; agent for the Lindsey Warehouse Company but
in fact purchased it for his own personal use and at
no time contemplated combining it with the Lindsey
Warehouse Company until after the death of the deceased, Mr. LeRoy M. Asay and did so only in an attempt to avoid personal liability to the applicant.
Such a finding is contrary to the testimony of Mr.
Miller corroborated by the testimony of Mr. Maxwell.
Such a finding is contrary to all evidence and is arbitrary and capricious since there is no evidence to
support said finding.
In the case of Jones vs. California Packing Corp.,
244 P2d 640 this Court has ruled upon this type of
conduct and stated at page 644:
"No issue is taken with the thought that
the Commission is not obliged to believe evidence if there is anything inherently incredible about it, or any circumstance to warrant
failure to accept it. However, where facts are
proved by uncontradicted testimony of competent disin terested witnesses and there is
nothing inherently unreasonable, nor any circumstance which would tend to raise doubt of
its truth, it should be taken as established.
Refusal to do so is an arbitrary disregard by
the trier of facts.
1

"If the Commission could go so far as to
refuse to believe such evidence, in the absence
of anything of substance to refute it, then it
certainly would possess arbitrary powers with
11

no effective review left available to the litigant . . .
"The law does not invest the Commission
with any such arbitrary power to disbelieve or
disregard uncontradicted, competent credible
evidence, as it appears to have done here."
The attitude of the Industrial Commission is
further indicated by its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law where at page 3 it provides the following:
"It appears to the Hearing Examiner that
a good share of the testimony became "after
the fact" testimony. Simply stated, it seems
that a serious liability was imminent - let us
find a way to move it over where we have insurance."
The attention of this Court is respectfully drawn
to the fact that had the hearing examiner not waited
from July 29, 1967 (the date of the hearing) until
the 29th of May, 1969 to render his decision he would
have remembered the persuasive evidence that required a differen t finding.
1

POINT II
WHENEVER THERE IS AN ISSUE OVER
WHICH THERE MAY BE DOUBT SUCH ISSUE
SHOULD BE RESOLVED IN FAVOR OF THE
EMPLOYEE.

This Court has stated the rule that every possible inference and every resolution of issues should
be drawn in favor of the employee. See Barber As·
phalt Corporati<m vs. Industrial Commissimi, 135
P2d 266 (Utah 1943); M & K Corporation vs. In12

C01nmission, 189 P2d 132 (Utah 1948) ;
Leven tis Vil. Indust'rial Commission, 35 P2d 770

d11sfTiol

1934).

The Industrial Commission ignored the guidelines as clearly defined by this Court on so many occasions. The Industrial Commission not only failed
to draw every inference or resolve every issue in favor of the employee but also disregarded and ignored
uncontradicted, competent, corroborated evidence
even given by disinterested witnesses.
This Court has on many occasions laid down the
rule that the Workmen's Compensation Act should
be liberally construed so as to afford coverage to the
employee whenever possible. See Ogden Iron Works
vs. Industrial Commission, 132 P2d 376 (Utah
1942) ; Salt Lake City vs. Industrial Commission,
140 P2d 644 (Utah 1943); Jones vs. CaliforniaPacki11g Co1'p. 244 P2d 640 (Utah 1952); Park Utah
Consol. Mines Co. vs. Industrial Commission, 36 P2d
979 (Utah 1934).
The Industrial Commission failed to follow these
guidelines. The Industrial Commission held that the
S & E Distributing operation was carried on as a
separate business apart from the Lindsey Warehouse
Company. This finding is contrary to all the evidence
with no evidence to support the same.
The death of the deceased occurred within six
weeks of the purchase of the S & E Distributing operation. Inasmuch as the accountant was out of town
13

all the fo1·mal steps necessary to include the S & E
Distributing operation in the Lindsey WarehouSfl
operation from an accounting standpoint had not
been perfected. The inclusion of the payroll for various employees in an IBM accounting system is a
complicated procedure which can only be handled by
a competent accountant skilled in IBM equipment
operation. The fact that the payroll for the S & E Dis.
tributing operation was not immediately included in
the IBM accounting payroll system of the Lindsey
Warehouse Corporation does not in and of itself require the conclusion that the S & E Distributing operation was a separate business. As has been previously indicated any question should be construed in
favor of the employee.
In 99 C.J.S. Section 64 Workmen's Conpensation
at page 278 the following is found:
"The fact that the worker was or was not
carried on the pay roll must be considered, al·
though it is not conclusive. One may be an em·
ployee under an act even though not on the
employer's pay roll, and even though no pay
roll is kept; but the fact of inclusion in the pay
roll has been cited as an indication of the re·
lation of employer and employee, and absence
therefrom as indicative of an intention not to
create the relation."
The reason for the failure to include the S &E
Distributing employees on the Lindsey Warehouse
payroll as of the date of death of the decedent has
been substantially explained by the testimony of a
14

(tisinteJ'ested competent witness - Mr. Maxwell.
'-.;1id
stands uncontradicted. The Industrial Commission found: "There is no probative evidence to make a finding that Lindsey Warehouse
Company, Inc. was the employer." (Finding of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Award, page 3) The hearing examiner further disregarded the testimony and
evidence which showed that the down payment for
the S & E Distributing Company was made on a
Lindsey Warehouse check. (Ex. 1) ( T 340)
POINT III
THE DECEASED LEROY M. ASAY WAS COVERED BY \VORKMEN'S COMPENSATION INSURANCE ISSUED BY THE STATE INSURANCE FUND.

The State Insurance Fund had a policy of inswance covering the operation of the Lindsey Warehnus2 Company and had in fact insured the operation
now known as the Lindsey Warehouse Company for
years (T 188-190) Although the State Insurance
Fund had been notified that the Lindsey Warehouse
Company had been incorporated the State Insurance
Fund did not issue an endorsement changing the
name of the insurance policy from Melvin M. Miller,
cllb/a Lindsey Warehouse Company until approximately one month after the death of the deceased (T
190) Technically, the State Insurance Fund was insuring all the employees of Melvin M. Miller in and
about the Lindsey Warehouse Company operation.
The State Insurance Fund issued a policy of in15

surance to Melvin M. Miller and subsequently the
Lindsey Warehouse Company, which policy by its
terms incorporated into it the statutes of the Stat€
of Utah regarding Workmen's Compensation. The
policy by incorporation of the statutes assumed the
entire liability of Mr. Melvin M. Miller to his employees as provided by the statutes of the State of
Utah. New employees were automatically covered
(both by practice and procedure) on the date of their
employment without any notification necessary to
the State Insurance Fund.
The policy of insurance upon Mr. Melvin M. Miller covered his entire liability arising out of the
Workmen's Compensation Act. Several Courts have
spoken on this issue. See West Chandler Farms Co.
vs. Industrial Commission, 173 P2d 84 (Ariz. 1946);
100 C.J.S. Workmen's Compensation Section 364 at
page 56.
This Court has in effect made the same ruling
where in the case of Empey vs. Indiistrial Commusion of Utah, 63 P2d 630 (Utah 1937) the Court stated that the "employer is either wholly within or al·
together outside its operation." In the Utah Code Annotated Section 35-3-11 it provides that in the event
premiums are paid by an employeer on the '·'estimated expenditure of wages" method, at the end of the
"period" if there is a deficiency it shall be forthwith
paid to the State Insurance Fund and if there is an
excess it is to be refunded to the employer. It is quite
clear that the payment of the premium for the insur·
16

ance coverage by the State Insurance Fund is done on
an estimated basis at the beginning of the period with
tho final ::>,djustment being made at the end of the
period.
The said statute contemplates the automatic insm·ance coverage for any new employees of any employer already covered by the State Insurance Fund.
No forms are sent to the State Insurance Fund. They
are not required by the State Insurance Fund or the
statute. No endorsements are necessary for the insurance policy for the inclusion of new employees.
There is merely an increase in the premium due based upon the payroll expenditure, which increase is
paid at the end of ithe payroll period.
The fact that the estimated premium may or
may not have reflected the increased number of employees brought in from the S & E Distributing operation to the Lindsey Warehouse Company can make
no difference. The State Insurance Fund was entitled
to the money for the premiums and if they were not
collected at the beginning of the period they were due
at the end of the period. The employer could not avoid
liability for payment of the premiums. The remedy
available to the State Insurance Fund for the failure
of the employer to pay the premiums - in the event
the employer failed to pay them was a civil action
against the employed as provided for in Utah Code
Ann. section 35-3-17 which allows interest at the rate
of 12% per annum.
The statute does not provide that an employer's
17

liability insurance for workmen's compensation is
forfeited upon his failure to pay the premiums. In
fact the statute sets foi-th the opposite position. It
allows only a cause of action against the employer for
failure to pay the premium due. Even if the employe1· had willfully failed to pay the State Insurance
Fund this would not void the policy of insurance but
would result in a cause of action arising in the State
Insurance Fund against the employer.
In the case of T-Vest Chandler Fanns Co. vs. Indusfrial Conmii.ssion, 173 P2d 84 (Ariz. 1946) the
Court at page 90 stated:

"Mere failure to include wages of employees who are covered by the policy, whethe1·
inadvertantly or under the belief that such employees are independent contractors, will not
void the policy between the insurer and the assured. It is not always possible to determine
the total number of employees thus new em- '
ployees upon which wages no premiums have
been paid are protected by these policies."
This rule has been followed and has been stated
by other Courts. See Schneider vs. Salvation Army,
14 N.W. 2d 467 (Minn. 1944).
This Court in the case of Empey vs. lnditstrial
Comniission of Utah, 63 P2d 630 (Utah 1937) restating a rule set forth in a Massachusetts case declared the following:
"If an employer becomes a subscriber he
becomes a subscriber for all purposes as to all
branches of one business with respect to all
18

those ir. his service under any contract of hire.
A11 the terms of the act are framed upon the
basis that the employer is either wholly within
or altogether outside its operation. There is no
suggestion or phrase warranting the inference
that there can be a divided or partial insurance.
"The practical administration of the act
renders it highly desirable that a single rule of
liability should apply throughout any single
business. Otherwise difficult and troublesome
questions often might arise as to liability or
non-liability dependent upon classifications of
employees and scope of their duties. Litigation
as to the line of demarcation between those
protected by the act and those not entitled to its
benefits would be almost inevitable. Instead of
being simple, plain and prompt in its operation, such divisions of insurance would promote complications, doubts and delays."
Although the Empey case is not identical to the
case at bar the rule it states is sufficiently broad to
more than adequately cover the present facts of this
case.
In the case of Leventis vs. Industrial Commission, 35 P2d 770 (Utah 1934) this Court held that
where both businesses were operated under the same
rnof and in or about the same establishment and that
each of the partners owned an interest in each of the
businesses that both businesses were liable for compensation where an employee of one of the businesses
was injured during the course of his employment.
19

CONCLUSION
Mr. LeRoy M. Asay was employed by the Lindsey Warehouse Company at the time of his death. All.
the evidence shows Mr. Miller acted in behalf of the
Lindsey Warehouse Company in hiring Mr. Asay and
directing his activities. The Industrial Commission
acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner when it ,
failed to draw the logical conclusion that Mr. Asay
was employed by the Lindsey Warehouse Company.
The State Insurance Fund had issued a policy of insurance which at the date of the death of Mr. Asay
was in the name of Melvin M. Miller, d/b/a Lindsey
Warehouse Company and fully covered Mr. Miller
and the Lindsey Warehouse Company as the employer of Mr. Asay.
This Court is respectfully requested to sustain
the award of the Industrial Commission insofar as it
holds that Mrs. Asay was the sole dependent of Mr.
Asay, deceased, and as such was entitled to the maximum benefits as provided by law but this Court is
respectfully requested to reverse the award of the
Industrial Commission insofar as it found that the
State Insurance Fund was not liable to pay said
award to the applicant.
Respectfully submitted,
MARK & SCHOENHALS
JACK L. SCHOENHALS
903 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah

Attorney for AP'J)licant
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